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Multihoming in the market for payment media: 
evidence from young Finnish consumers 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 25/2004 





In the market for payment media, some consumers use only one medium when 
paying for their point-of-sale transactions, while others multihome and use many. 
As this pattern reflects the diffusion of new payment media, we take a look at the 
determinants of the adoption of new payment media through the window of 
multihoming. Using data on young Finnish consumers, we find that one key 
determinant of multihoming behaviour is consumer awareness. Our instrumental 
variable estimates indicate that the better informed use 1.2–1.3 times more 
payment media than the less informed. Because many payment method 
innovations are typically first used simultaneously with established methods, our 
results suggest that increasing consumer awareness could significantly speed up 
the adoption of new means of payment, such electronic money and mobile 
payments. 
 
Key words: payment media, multihoming, consumer awareness, adoption of 
financial technology 
 
JEL classification numbers: G200, E590  
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Multihoming-ilmiö maksuvälineiden markkinoilla: 
evidenssiä nuorista suomalaisista kuluttajista 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 25/2004 





Jotkut kuluttajat käyttävät vain yhtä maksuvälinettä ostoksiensa maksamiseen, 
kun taas toiset käyttävät useampia. Usean järjestelmän rinnakkaisesta käytöstä 
käytetään nimitystä multihoming. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan uusien 
maksutapojen leviämiseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä multihoming-ilmiön kautta. 
Nuoria suomalaisia kuluttajia kuvaavan aineiston perusteella havaitaan, että 
kuluttajien tietoisuus on yksi ilmiön keskeinen selittäjä. Parhaiten informoidut 
kuluttajat käyttävät 1,2–1,3 kertaa useampia maksutapoja kuin vähemmän infor-
moidut. Koska monia uusia maksuvälineitä käytetään yleensä ensin rinnan van-
hojen maksutapojen kanssa, tulokset viittaavat siihen, että kuluttajien tietoisuuden 
kohentaminen voisi merkittävästi lisätä uusien maksutapojen, kuten sähköisen 
rahan ja mobiilimaksamisen, leviämisnopeutta. 
 
Avainsanat: maksuvälineet, multihoming-ilmiö, kuluttajien tietoisuus, uuden 
tekniikan käyttöönotto 
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Monetary history is full of examples where new payment media have taken off 
only slowly, if at all. It is not well understood what hampers the diffusion of these 
financial innovations, notably because of a lack of systematic evidence.
1 In 
particular, it can be hard to obtain consumer-level data on early adopters of 
emerging payment media. In this paper we take advantage of the exceptional 
feature of the payment media market that some consumers only use one medium, 
while others adopt many, ie, ‘multihome’. Such multihoming essentially reflects 
the diffusion of new payment media, because even the most recent major 
innovations, coins, checks, paper money, and the payment card, have been used 
over an extensive period of time in chorus with the previously established 
payment media (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999). This novel insight gives us a 
possibility to view the determinants of the adoption of new payment media 
through the window of multihoming. 
  The known determinants of the adoption of new payment methods are natural. 
Monetary costs hinder diffusion (cf, eg, Humphrey, Kim, and Vale 2001), the rate 
of adoption varies with consumer demographics (such as age, education and 
home-ownership status; see Carow and Staten 1999, Mantel 2000), and localized 
feedback loops between consumers and merchants matter (Rysman 2004). There 
also is a received marketing tenet suggesting that providing information about a 
new product fosters its diffusion, especially if the adoption is held back by non-
monetary costs, such as the costs arising from imperfect consumer information, 
and learning and searching costs. But, prior to our study, virtually no evidence 
exists on the effects of the non-monetary costs on the adoption of new payment 
media, nor whether the adoption could be facilitated by information provision. 
  Our evidence from a random sample of young Finnish consumers suggests 
that the non-monetary costs cannot be overlooked. In particular, we argue and find 
that consumer awareness enhances multihoming. The economics of this positive 
relation is that consumer awareness reduces learning and searching costs as well 
as imperfect consumer information. It does so almost by definition. 
  Before we run into empirics and put consumer awareness into specific terms 
to quantify its effect, we formulate a theoretical model of multihoming. In our 
model consumers multihome, because it reduces the time cost of transactions. The 
negative relation arises because the more payment media a consumer carries, the 
easier her access to a modern economy’s accounting network in different 
circumstances. Balancing the time cost of transactions against the monetary and 
                                                 
1 See Frame and White (2004) for a review of the scarce empirical literature on financial 
innovations and their diffusion. In many other dimensions, the literature on payment systems and 
methods is quite extensive, as can be seen from the excellent surveys by Hancock and Humphrey 
(1998) and Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger (2002).  
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non-monetary costs of adopting multiple payment media results in the optimal 
level of multihoming. The model also predicts that the optimal level of 
multihoming depends on consumer awareness, because the non-monetary costs 
are inversely related to it. 
  Although our model results in an estimating equation that is equivalent to a 
reduced form specification, the structural derivation of the model uncovers the 
components of the effect of consumer awareness that the reduced form estimate 
mirrors. The theory also provides us with the conditional mean of a regression 
model, which is identical to the conditional mean of a Poisson (count) regression 
model with multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity. As we have a count variable 
as the dependent variable, we should model a count process, something that our 
conditional mean equation takes into account by design. It also turns out that 
unobserved heterogeneity cannot be overlooked. To tackle with the unobserved 
heterogeneity, we need instruments. Here again the model turns out to be helpful, 
suggesting theoretically motivated instruments. 
  As we will argue, multihoming is an increasingly relevant phenomenon in 
modern economies with advanced accounting networks and payment markets. 
Because we believe that Finland is a good approximation of such an economy, we 
test the predictions of our model of multihoming using Finnish data. We can also 
take advantage of some unique features of the survey data on young Finnish 
consumers available to us. 
 
–  The data contains direct measures of the point-of-sale paying habits of 
consumers. The measures allow us to generate a dependent variable at the 
level of individual consumers that distinguishes the point-of-sale paying from 
settling bills and the actual use of the payment media from having (an access 
to) them. 
–  As Guiso and Jappelli (2003) point out in their study of the consumer 
awareness and stock market participation, consumer awareness can take many 
guises and be an elusive concept, for it can be both about the existence and 
characteristics of payment media. We get a grip of it because the data includes 
a series of questions capturing the consumers’ exposure to the provision of 
information about financial services and payment media. The data also 
contains instruments, which allow us to control for the potential endogeneity 
of consumer awareness. 
–  Young consumers typically show a great rate of adoption of new payment 
media (Humphrey et al 2001 and Stix 2003). We can evaluate the importance 
of both non-monetary and monetary costs for this segment of consumers in 
isolation. 
 
Our data supports the notion of multihoming, as more than half of the young 
Finnish customers in our sample multihome. Not surprisingly, we find that the  
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monetary costs of adoption are also important for the young. But consumer 
awareness turns out to be at least equally important determinant of multihoming. 
Endogeneity of consumer awareness cannot, however, be ignored, because we 
find that not controlling for the endogeneity can severely bias the effect of 
consumer awareness downwards. Our instrumental variable and GMM estimates 
indicate that the better informed use 1.2–1.3 times more payment media than the 
less informed. We show that the effect of consumer awareness on multihoming is 
robust to introducing a rich set of control variables, such as consumer 
characteristics and variables describing the consumers’ banking relationships. It 
also survives a number of other empirical checks. 
  The key implication of our finding is that increasing consumer awareness can 
speed up the adoption of payment method innovations, such electronic money and 
mobile payments. Combined with theory (eg, Rochet and Tirole 2003), the finding 
also yields a variety of managerial implications for merchants and the issuers of 
payment media that will be elaborated in conclusions. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we 
describe some special characteristics of the Finnish market of payment media that 
make Finland a neat case for our study. In section 3 we consider the theoretical 
underpinnings of our study. The empirical implementation of the theoretical 
model is explained in section 4. In section 5 we describe our data and the 
construction of variables. We go trough the basic estimations, their results, and 
robustness tests in section 6. In section 7 we address the potential endogeneity of 
consumer awareness. The concluding section (section 8) includes a discussion of 
the implications of our findings for the adoption of new payment media. 
 
 
2  The Finnish market for payment media 
The Finnish market for payment media has some distinctive properties that 
simplify the study of multihoming.
2 There are also some profound differences 
with the often-studied US market of payment media (see Ausubel 1991 and 
Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala 2000 for a description of the US market). 
  The Finnish market for payment media is relatively advanced, for Finns 
increasingly rely on accessing electronic payment networks in point-of-sale 
paying. Checks are for example no longer used in consumer trade, whereas debit 
cards are increasingly popular. Various surveys show that between 1999 and 
2003, the use of debit cards as the most common way of paying for daily 
                                                 
2 Most of the industry details presented here are available at The Finnish Bankers’ Association 
www-pages. For more information, see http://www.pankkiyhdistys.fi/english/index.html.  
10 
consumer goods and services increased from 17% to 30%. In 2002, they 
accounted for 2/3 of the value of all card payments. 
  The use of cash is decreasing rapidly. Between 1999 and 2003, the use of cash 
as a way of paying for daily consumer goods and services decreased by 18% (13 
percentage points, to 58%). Although it still is relatively common in point-of-sale 
transactions, the ratio of currency in circulation to GDP, about 1.8% in 2002, is in 
Finland among the lowest in Europe. Moreover, the use of cash is almost 
invariantly preceded by the use of an ATM: The entire currency in circulation (2,4 
billion euros) goes through the ATMs seven times a year. There are two reasons 
for this: First, virtually everyone has a banking account where incomes are 
credited directly and an ATM (compatible) card. The use of cash without first 
accessing one’s bank account via an ATM is a habit that is restricted to the senior 
citizens that have never learned to use ATMs. Second, the coverage of the ATM 
networks is rather extensive in Finland, and the networks of different banks allow 
for roaming.
3 
  In Finland the market for payment media is concentrated, because the few 
main deposit banks that dominate the banking sector are the main issuers of 
payment media. Because the issuers of payment media are relatively homogenous 
the payment media, their pricing, and the ways of providing them with customers 
tend to be similar across the issuers, at least after controlling for the banking 
relationships of consumers. 
  The pricing of the payment media is also quite simple. At least one ATM or 
payment card is often automatically attached to a banking account as a part of a 
banking service package. As explained by Koskinen (2001), the packages can 
include various payment media, whose pricing hence depends on the pricing of 
the banking service packages. Their pricing in turn is tied to the age of a 
consumer. It is typical that the basic packages are free of charge until the age of 
26. 
  Last but not least, Finns use their cards primarily for paying, not for accessing 
credit. For example, our data (described more closely in section 5.1) tells us that 
in 2002, 37% of the young had an outstanding credit balance, but only for 5% it 
originated from payment card borrowing (for 4% from credit cards). For the rest, 
the loan was either a mortgage or a student loan. Borrowing via payment cards is 
directly related to age even within the young. Instead of borrowing, the young 
                                                 
3 The reason for the extensive ATM networks is that the Finnish banking sector was heavily 
regulated until the late 1980s. Because both deposit and loan interest rates were regulated, the 
banking groups competed by the scope of their service network. The last phase of the service 
competition was the introduction of ATMs. The deregulation and the subsequent banking crisis of 
the early 1990s actually first intensified the competition through ATM networks, because the 
banks replaced their branches by a set of ATMs to cut down costs.  
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have other motivations to acquire a credit card, such as a Visa or a MasterCard. 
One of them is the desire to use it abroad in the point-of-sale transactions. 
 
 
3  Multiple payment methods in a shopping time 
model 
In this section, we formulate a theoretical model of multihoming. We use the 
model to systematically develop our main hypothesis about the effect of consumer 
awareness on the adoption of payment media. The model formulation is borrowed 
from the literature on money demand, as there is no need to derive a new theory 
of payment media for our purposes. Our simple model results in an estimating 
equation that is equivalent to a reduced form specification. The model is, 
however, informative, for it both makes our assumptions transparent and puts 
structure into our empirics, in particular, into the search for instruments. 
 
 
3.1 Two  observations 
We build our analysis of payment media on two observations. First, as also the 
studies by Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (1996, 2000) indicate, an increasing 
fraction of all point-of-sale purchases of goods and services are paid for by means 
of signals to an accounting network. The widespread use of the electronic 
payment media means that there is less need for transfers of a tangible medium of 
exchange. But more substantially, even when the tangible medium is transferred, 
it is often preceded by a connection to an ATM network. Indeed, Attanasio, 
Guiso, and Japelli (2002) find that the diffusion of ATM cards is the main factor 
explaining the shrinking currency holding. Because paying in cash practically 
translates into owning and using an ATM card, we interpret an ATM card as yet 
another variety of a payment card. An ATM card is a payment card with improved 
security and privacy, but with larger costs of debiting a buyer’s account, because 
all physical, monetary, and time costs are borne by the cardholder prior to a 
transaction. 
  Our second building block comes from the costs of transaction time. We 
hypothesize that adopting additional payment media can reduce them. As Rochet 
and Tirole (2003) demonstrate, the two-sided feature of payment media market 
easily leads to a situation where some merchants do not accept some payment 
media that are accepted by other merchants. Thus, the broader is the set of 
payment media a consumer carries, the easier is her access to the accounting 
network in various circumstances, since she can more flexibly initiate debits and  
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credits to her wealth accounts for transaction purposes. As a result, in countries 
like Finland where checks are no longer used in the point-of-sale transactions, 
consumers effectively choose an optimal number of various cards to economize 
the transaction time and associated costs. 
 
 
3.2  Implications of the two observations 
The two observations yield two implications. First, today’s consumers choose the 
optimal number of payment media rather than the optimal currency holding. They 
find the optimal number, ie, the optimal level of multihoming, by weighting the 
time cost of transactions against the cost of adopting multiple payment media. In 
other words, the trade-off underlying the demand for payment media is 
deceptively similar to that behind the demand for money in the classic Baumol-
Tobin model (Baumol 1952, and Tobin 1956). We therefore take the key 
ingredients for our model from the modern variants of the Baumol-Tobin model 
by McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), Santomero and Seater (1996), Mulligan and 
Sala-i-Martin (2000), and Attanasio et al (2002).
4 
  Second, the marginal benefit (in terms of reduced shopping time) of adopting 
new payment cards is decreasing in a similar manner as the marginal benefit of 
real cash balances in the Baumol-Tobin model. This implication may sound 
strong, for there is a large literature building on the various differences between 
the payment cards (see, eg, Shy and Tarkka 2002, and the references therein). 
Here we abstract from such differences. Nonetheless, we have good reasons to 
think that for our purposes the abstraction is less restrictive than it seems to be 
from the outset: As Santomero and Seater (1996) suggest, payment media can be 
hard to rank unambiguously, precisely because they differ in many dimensions. 
Some are associated with foregone interest, some involve longer processing costs, 
some provide more privacy, some protect better for fraud and others for accidental 
losses. A typical model incorporates one or two dimensions but neglects the rest, 
both because of analytical tractability and because of the perceived difficulties in 
identifying which method outperforms the others and in what dimensions. 
Although a complete model of multihoming would incorporate all these 
differences, it should still involve a decreasing marginal benefit in the reduction 
of shopping time. The property should arise in particular, if the payment cards are 
                                                 
4 Santomero and Seater (1996), in particular, allow for several payment media. In their model 
obtaining a medium of exchange requires a separate ‘trip to the bank’ for each medium and, 
accordingly, consumers choose the number of banking trips separately for each payment medium. 
In contrast, our model builds on the assumption that consumers directly choose the number of 
payment media instead of the number of banking trips associated with each medium.  
13 
heterogeneous in how effectively they reduce shopping time and if consumers 
adopted them in their preference order. 
  Yet another reason why we can focus on the number of payment cards and on 
their effectiveness in generating transaction services is that technological progress 
may – somewhat paradoxically – have rendered the payment media more 
homogeneous. If checks are no longer used and if using cash means using an 
ATM card, the relevant choice set for consumers reduces to the set of available 
cards. At least this situation essentially prevailed in Finland under the period 
where our data comes from. 
 
 
3.3 Model  formulation 
The abovementioned two implications suggest that multihoming reduces the time 
cost of transactions but its marginal effect is decreasing. The following Baumol-













⎛ = τ  (3.1) 
 
where A is a technology parameter, T is the amount of transactions to be 
conducted, and γ1 and γ2 are parameters, and n is the principal variable of the 
interest, the number of payment cards adopted by a consumer, ie, her level of 
multihoming. Building on this technology, our goal is to derive a model of the 
determination of n that guides our empirics. 
 Let  ω denote the time cost of transactions (shadow value of time), and ψ the 
monetary and non-monetary cost of adopting a new payment medium, which is 
assumed to be fixed with respect to the number of adopted payment media. The 
consumer chooses n so as to minimize the sum of the costs of transaction time, 
ωτ, and the total adoption costs, ψn, subject to the transaction technology (3.1). 



















=  (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.2) shows how the optimal level of multihoming is directly related to 
the amount of transactions, T, and inversely related to the adoption cost, ψ. Our 
focus is on the adoption cost. 
  The models of technology adoption by consumers suggest that the non-
monetary costs, eg, searching and learning costs, primarily arise from imperfect  
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consumer information. Because consumer awareness, denoted by a in what 
follows, reduces it and thus ψ almost by definition, we assume that ψ = ψ(a) with 
ψ′(a) < 0. It then immediately follows from (3.2) that n′(a) > 0, that is, our model 
predicts that the optimal level of multihoming is directly related to consumer 
awareness. This way of introducing awareness is admittedly ad hoc, but its 
empirical specification in the subsequent section allows for a richer interpretation, 
including an analysis of endogeneity of a. 
 
 
4  Empirical model of multihoming 
4.1 Consumer  heterogeneity 
In practise both the adoption cost, ψ, and the amount of transactions, T, consist of 
several factors and probably vary across consumers. To allow for this type of 





















=  (4.1) 
 
for each consumer i = 1, 2, ..., N. We follow Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) 
and assume that ψi varies both with observable and unobservable characteristics 
of consumers. For example, income and financial wealth are observable in our 
data. Also many demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as gender, 
age and education, are observable to us. So is the awareness of consumer i, ai. 
  The unobservable consumer heterogeneity is defined as 
 
i i i i a ' x ln α + δ − ψ ≡ υ  (4.2) 
 
where δ is a column vector, and x
'
i is a row vector that includes a constant and the 
observable consumer characteristics except for awareness. The unobservable 
consumer-specific component defined by (4.2) is assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed, as well as independent of the amount of transactions, 
Ti, and the observable consumer characteristics, xi and ai, ie,  0 ) T , a , x ( E i i i i = υ . In 
section 7 we show that this assumption can to some extent be relaxed. 









υ − δ − α + γ + γ + γ ω
γ +
= i i i i 2 2 2
2
i ' x a T ln ) ( A ln
1
1
exp n  (4.3)  
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Because  ω and Ti are unobservable, we still need to make two auxiliary 
assumptions to arrive at an estimable model. 
  First, as (4.3) already suggests, we assume that the time cost of transactions, 
ω, does not vary across consumers conditional on xi. As a result, the first term, 
lnωAγ2, in the exponent function can be subsumed into x
'
i. 
  Second, although we cannot directly measure Ti, we can observe consumers’ 
income levels. An implication of the standard consumption function relation is 
that there is one-to-one mapping from a consumer’s income to her consumption. 
We postulate that there is also one-to-one mapping from the consumption to Ti: 
the more one consumes, the more transactions need to be initiated. Such a relation 
is intuitive and, accordingly, it has been implicitly assumed in the previous 
literature, eg, in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Attasanio et al (2002). It 
follows that a consumer’s income and the amount of transactions she carries out 
have one-to-one relation. We capture the relation by assuming that Ti is a non-
linear function of a consumer’s income and her other characteristics, ie, that 
 
( ) ∑ = θ + θ + θ =
3 j ij j
2
i 2 i 1 i x INC INC exp T  (4.4) 
 
where INCi denotes consumer i’s income level. The exponential specification in 
(4.4) is chosen, because Ti is a count variable. Under our specification, Ti could be 
the conditional mean of a Poisson density, and hence an outcome of a count 
process.
5 Specification (4.4) also ensures that the flow of transactions is positive. 
  After substituting (4.4) for (4.3) and using the first assumption, we have 
 
( ) i 3 j ij j
2
i 2 i 1 i 0 i x INC INC a exp n ε π + π + π + π = ∑ =  (4.5) 
 












exp  with  1 ) x , a , T ( E i i i i = ε , 
2
0 1 γ +
α
≡ π  and, expect for π0 
and the constant, 
2




δ − θ γ + γ
≡ π . 
 
 
                                                 
5 We could generalize this ‘conditional mean’ to allow for multiplicative unobserved 
heterogeneity, provided that the multiplicative component is iid and independent of both the 
regressors and vi. The quasi-likelihood methods for count data that we will use would be robust to 
this type of extension (see Wooldridge 1997, 379–380). For simplicity, we do not pursue this 
extension.  
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4.2 Estimation  issues 
Equation (4.5) forms the gist of our empirical model of multihoming, as it 
provides us with the conditional mean of a regression model. We use three 
methods to estimate the model and particularly, π0, the effect of consumer 
awareness on multihoming. As a benchmark we estimate a model with a linear 
mean function using OLS. The linear model is easy to justify even if the 
conditional mean function is given by (4.5), because in practice the two 
specifications produce qualitatively similar estimates.
6 Because ni > 0, we can also 
resort to the widely-used log transformation of the dependent variable when 
estimating the parameters of the conditional mean equation (4.5). OLS estimation 
of the resulting transformed model provides us with a second set of results. 
Finally, we estimate the model using the Poisson quasi-likelihood method and the 
robust Huber-White variance-covariance matrix. 
  The Poisson quasi-likelihood method has two advantages: First, the 
conditional mean in (4.5) is conveniently identical to the conditional mean of a 
Poisson (count) regression model with multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity 
(see for example Wooldridge 1997, 379–380 and Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 97–
98).
7 As will be explained in the next section, the level of multihoming – our 
dependent variable – is the number of different payment media a young consumer 
uses when paying for her purchases or consumption of services. An implication of 
such a dependent variable is that we would have to model a count process, 
something that our conditional mean equation takes into account by design. 
  The second advantage is that we know from the results for generalized count 
models that the consistency of estimation requires only a correct specification of 
the mean. Under the currently maintained assumption of exogenous consumer 
awareness, the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator will yield consistent 
estimates of the parameters of the conditional mean function, in particular, ￿0. 
Because we have specified neither a variance function nor the probability density 
                                                 
6 The reason for the similarity is that it can be shown using a first-order Taylor series expansion of 
the conditional mean around the sample mean of the dependent variable, n , that linear mean slope 
coefficients are approximately n  times exponential slope coefficients (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 
p. 89). 
7 This generalized count regression has the property that the unobservables and observables are 
treated symmetrically.  
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function for εi, the standard Huber-White sandwich estimator can be used to 
obtain consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix (Wooldridge 1997).
8 
  Less conveniently, we cannot, as equation (4.5) shows, without additional 
assumptions identify the structural parameters γ2 and α from the coefficient of ai. 
Only the total effect of consumer awareness on multihoming can be quantified 
from the data. Nonetheless, the structural derivation of the model uncovers the 
theoretical components of the total effect. 
 
 
5  Data and definition of variables 
5.1 Data 
The Finnish Bankers’ Association has commissioned a survey of young adults (in 
Finnish: ‘Nuorisotutkimus’) in 1996, 2000 and 2002. The primary aim of the 
surveys has been to collect data on the consumption habits of young Finns and 
their views about banking and financial products and services. The data for our 
analysis comes from the survey conducted between the 21
st February and 5
th 
March, 2002. The survey was based on a random sample of 1004 young adults 
aged between 15 and 28. We use the entire sample, which represents 
approximately 1/900 of the total population in the age group. 
  The data is rich in detail concerning the young adults’ demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, financial affairs, banking relationships, and 
information about banking products and financial affairs, including payment 
media. The data also includes information about the use of various payment media 
in retail transactions. 
 
 
                                                 
8 By specifying a mixing distribution for εi, we could derive the exact marginal distribution for the 
dependent variable. A two-parameter gamma distribution would result in a Poisson-gamma 
mixture, ie, the familiar negative binomial model for counts (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 100–
101). However, because a specific parametric distributional assumption for εi is at best a crude 
approximation, we follow a more general approach of using the Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood method and the Huber-White variance-covariance estimator. We return to this issue in 
the robustness tests in section 5.2.  
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5.2 Dependent  variable 
In this study the dependent variable, ni, is the number of different payment media 
a young consumer uses when paying for her purchases or consumption of 
services. The dependent variable summarizes the answers of the following three 
related questions in the survey:
9 
 
1)  What is the most typical way you pay for your purchases or consumption of 
services? i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, 
v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value 
card , viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify) 
2)  What about the second most typical way? Is it i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) 
combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a 
retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, 
ix) by other means, how? (specify), x) there is no second way 
3)  Do you still use another ways to pay for your purchases or consumption of 
services? If yes, what are these? i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-
credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa 
Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, 
how? (specify), x) there are no additional ways. 
 
Our method of counting of payment media has some useful properties. First, the 
three questions identify virtually all the payment media consumers could use 
when paying for consumption or services at the point-of-sale in Finland. 
Moreover, even if a payment medium was not properly identified, the respondents 
had three possibilities to identify such a medium by themselves. But no one did. 
Third, all the questions concern actually using a payment medium, not having an 
access to it. We therefore need not to worry about card owners who never use 
their cards even if they constituted a significant fraction of card ownership as, eg, 
in Austria (see Stix 2003). Such phenomenon of ‘sleeping’ cards can also exist in 
Finland where, as mentioned in section 2, almost every young has a banking 
account to which a payment card is automatically attached as a part of a (free) 
banking service package. 
  Yet another useful property of our data is that just before the questions of the 
use of payment media in retail transactions were presented, the respondents had 
been asked about their habits of paying for their bills. Our count variable should 
thus capture the young adults’ payment habits in point-of-sale-transactions instead 
of their bill-paying habits. 
 
                                                 
9 Translation from Finnish by the authors.  
19 
5.3 Consumer  awareness 
The previous literature unfortunately provides little help in choosing a proxy for 
consumer awareness, ai. We measure it based on a series of questions included in 
the survey that concern the provision of information about payment media. We 
code an indicator variable that equals 1, if the respondent answered of having 
either received or been offered a lot of information about debit or credit cards, 
ways of paying bills, use of transaction accounts, or borrowing through credit 
cards; and zero otherwise. 
  The rationale for our definition of ai is that a consumer’s awareness of the 
existence and characteristics of payment media is likely to be directly related to 
the amount of information the consumer has been offered about them. The amount 
should, in turn, be directly related to the systematic and unsystematic forms of 
information provision by the various issuers of payment media. The currently 
maintained assumption of exogenous awareness requires that the exposure by 
consumer i to the information provision (as captured by ai) is not related to εi (the 
unobservable consumer heterogeneity) after conditioning on the other observables 
(in x′i). 
  Although our measure of consumer awareness is certainly imperfect, we have 
several reasons to trust in it. First, in count models with an exponential mean 
function, the effect of an additive measurement error in a right-hand-side variable 
is qualitatively identical to that of unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998, 307–309). This property means that our results based on the Poisson 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator are robust to such a measurement error, 
provided that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the regressors. Second, 
we show that our results hold in instrumental variable estimations that corrects for 
errors-in-variables when the measurement error and a regressor do correlate. 
Third, we also establish the robustness of our results with respect to an alternative 
proxy for consumer awareness. Finally, if our proxy failed to capture consumer 
awareness in a meaningful way, we should find no statistically significant effects. 
 
 
5.4 Control  variables 
The derivation of equation (4.5) suggests that the vector of observables, x′i, should 
include variables that reflect, ψi, the monetary and non-monetary costs of 
adopting new payment media. The vector should also include variables affecting 
the amount of transactions, Ti, because we have assumed in (4.4) that it is a 
function of a consumer’s income and her other characteristics. 
  It is ultimately an empirical matter which variables affect the adoption costs 
and the amount of transactions. We therefore construct two different sets of  
20 
control variables. The first set consists of demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics: sex (SEX = 1 if the respondent is female), age in years (AGE), age 
squared (AGESQ), employment status (EMP  = if employed; UNEMP  = if 
unemployed, the omitted category is for students), level of completed or on-going 
education (HIGH = 1, if university, MEDIUM = 1 if high school or equivalent, 
the omitted category is for those with elementary school education), household 
type (NOHOUSEH = 1, if lives with parents), type of family (CHILDREN = 1, if 
has at least one child), residential area (CITY = 1 if lives in a city with more than 
30  000 inhabitants), geographic region of residence (WEST  =  1, EAST  =  1, 
NORTH = 1, if lives in these parts of Finland, the omitted category represents the 
respondents living in south), income (INCOME, in thousands of EUR), income 
squared (INCOMESQ), the type of real wealth (RWEALTH = 1 if owns a real 
estate, a house or a condominium), financial wealth (FWEALTH  =  1, if has 
savings in deposit or savings accounts, if owns stocks, shares of mutual funds, 
bonds, private pension insurance, or if has made other financial investments), and 
liquid wealth (LWEALTH = 1, if has savings in transaction accounts). 
  The demographic and education variables control for heterogeneity in 
adoption costs and consumption behavior, because they reflect preferences and 
ability. Dummies for the residential area and region capture the notion that 
payment media is a two-sided market and the adoption determinants considered 
by Attanasio et al (2002), Stix (2003) and Rysman (2004), such as the number of 
ATM points in the area of residence and regional variation in the acceptance of 
payment media by retailers. They also capture other regional variation affecting 
multihoming. For example, the determinants of consumer awareness uncovered 
by Guiso and Jappelli (2003) include geographical variations in the intensity of 
social networks and learning as well as in the costs of spreading information about 
payment media. We also control for income and the type of wealth, because they 
affect consumption patterns and measure how relevant fixed monetary adoption 
costs are. 
  The second set of control variables comes from the regressors depicting 
consumers’ relationship to their deposit banks: Identity of a consumer’s main 
bank (MBANK_h = 1, if principally uses the services of bank h, h = 1, 2, …, 6, 
the omitted category is for those who principally use the services of bank 7), use 
of other banks (NOSBANK = 1, if uses the services of other banks in addition to 
the main bank), choice of the main bank (BCHOICE = 1, if the main bank has 
been chosen by the respondent herself and not, eg, by her parents or spouse), 
duration of the relationship with the main bank (BLENGHT = 1 if has been a 
customer of the current main bank since her birth), membership in the main 
bank’s youth club (BCLUB = 1 if a member), and recent switch of main bank 
(SWBANK = 1 if has changed the main bank over the past 12 months). 
  Controlling for the banking relationships is quite natural because of the 
prominent role of the deposit banks in the Finnish market for payment media (see  
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section 2). We trust that these regressors reflect heterogeneity in adoption costs: 
The MBANK_h -dummies and NOSBANK should capture, for example, 
differences in the pricing of various cards and marketing strategies across the 
banks. We can moreover conjecture that BCLUB proxy the initial level of 
consumer awareness about payment media, as a former member of a bank’s youth 
club should be relatively well informed about banking products and services. 
  We introduce the two sets of controls sequentially into the model to ensure 
that our results are not driven by potential (unmodelled) endogeneity of some of 
the control variables in the second set of regressors. Variable SWBANK is for 
example potentially endogenous, because consumers could self-select, ie, switch 





6.1 Descriptive  statistics 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. They show that the respondents 
are on average 21 years old and have annual income of about 8 100 EUR. A bit 
more than half of them are female, some 60% of them are students and around 
28% have a university degree or are studying for one. 
  The table also indicates that multihoming is common in the market for 
payment media, but its scope is rather restricted. The dummy variable, 
DMHOME, which equals zero if the respondent singlehomes and unity if the 
respondent multihomes, indicates that 53% of the young Finns use more than one 
payment medium in their point-of-sale transactions.
11 The count variable, ni, 
varies from 1 to 3 and has a mean of 1.6.
12 The average consumer awareness, ai, is 
rather high, 0.7. Our measures thus indicate that consumer awareness is ‘more 
widespread’ than multihoming. This is what we expect, for it would contradict the 
idea of awareness, if the opposite held.  
 
                                                 
10 Besides the control variables described here we have tried several other groupings and sets. Our 
results are robust to such alternative specifications as also the robustness tests of the next section 
indicate. 
11 While not shown in the table, an ATM card is the primary method for the young to debit their 
accounts. Approximately 3/4 of the respondents keeps cash as their most typical way of paying for 
their purchases or consumption of services. This fact violates none of our assumptions. 
12 One respondent used four payment methods. We recoded her answer to equal three.  
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Table 1.   Descriptive statistics 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
n 946 1.59 0.61 1 3
DMHOME 946 0.53 0.50 0 1
a 946 0.70 0.46 0 1
INCOME 946 8.14 9.64 0 37.80
AGE 946 21.22 3.99 15 28
SEX 946 0.51 0.50 0 1
LIVCITY 946 0.48 0.50 0 1
WEST 946 0.38 0.48 0 1
EAST 946 0.12 0.33 0 1
NORTH 946 0.13 0.34 0 1
EMP 946 0.32 0.47 0 1
UNEMP 946 0.07 0.25 0 1
HIGH 946 0.28 0.45 0 1
MEDIUM 946 0.62 0.49 0 1
NOHOUSEH 946 0.44 0.50 0 1
CHILDREN 946 0.09 0.28 0 1
RWEALTH 946 0.14 0.35 0 1
FWEALTH 946 0.27 0.44 0 1
LWEALTH 946 0.25 0.44 0 1
MBANK_1 946 0.33 0.47 0 1
MBANK_2 946 0.39 0.49 0 1
MBANK_3 946 0.06 0.23 0 1
MBANK_4 946 0.15 0.36 0 1
MBANK_5 946 0.02 0.14 0 1
MBANK_6 946 0.03 0.17 0 1
NOSBANK 946 0.74 0.44 0 1
BCHOICE 931 0.36 0.48 0 1
BLENGTH 849 0.64 0.48 0 1
BCLUB 937 0.57 0.50 0 1
SWBANK 934 0.03 0.16 0 1
 
      Note: Data source is ‘Nuorisotutkimus 2002’ -survey of the 
Finnish Banker’s Association. 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of ni conditional on ai. The figure suggests that 
multihoming and consumer awareness are not independent, as consumer 
awareness clearly shifts the distribution of ni to the right. As many as 65.4% of the 
uninformed consumers (with ai = 0) use only one payment medium, while the 
corresponding percentage for the informed is 39.1%. Put differently, 83% of the 
multihomers are better informed. To formally assess for the presence of 
dependence between multihoming and awareness, we compute Pearson’s χ
2-test. 
The test for independence obtains a value of 55.75 (d.f. = 2), which allows us to 
firmly reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. 
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Figure 1.  Multihoming by the uneinformed (a = 0) and 


























a = 0 a = 1
 




6.2 Basic  estimations 
In Panel A of Table 2 we present the results of the OLS, OLS with the log-
transformed dependent variable (‘log-OLS’) and Poisson quasi-likelihood 
estimations when only the first set of control variables is included. Panel B reports 
the results when both sets of controls are used. The results show that the dummy 
for consumer awareness obtains a positive coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, irrespective of the estimation method and the included 
set of control variables. This finding suggests that consumer awareness increases 
multihoming. 
  As to other determinants of multihoming, they are mostly in line with our 
expectations. Propensity to multihome is increasing in INCOME, but the positive 
relation begins to weaken after a threshold. Financial asset ownership also 
increases multihoming. If the findings are not entirely driven by different 
consumption patterns of the affluent, they indicate that also the young care about 
the monetary costs of adoption. Multihoming also depends on gender and 
education as the coefficients of SEX and HIGH suggests. Females, university 
students, and graduates use more payment media than their otherwise identical 
counterparts. From Panel B we can observe that membership in a bank’s youth  
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club turns out to be the only significant (at the 1% level) determinant of 
multihoming from the second set of control variables. 
 
Table 2.   Basic regression results 
 
PANEL A
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.14 0.04 *** 0.09 0.02 *** 0.09 0.02 ***
INCOME 0.02 6.2E-03 *** 0.01 3.8E-03 *** 0.01 3.9E-03 ***
INCOMESQ -3.5E-04 1.8E-04 * -2.4E-04 1.1E-04 ** -2.2E-04 1.2E-04 *
AGE 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.04 **
AGESQ -1.5E-03 1.6E-03 -9.2E-04 9.8E-04 -1.8E-03 9.5E-04 *
SEX 0.10 0.04 *** 0.06 0.02 *** 0.06 0.02 ***
LIVCITY 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 * 0.03 0.02
WEST -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.03
EAST 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04
NORTH 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
EMP 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 5.7E-03 0.04
UNEMP -0.03 0.08 -7.9E-03 0.05 -0.02 0.05
HIGH 0.26 0.09 *** 0.17 0.06 *** 0.17 0.06 ***
MEDIUM 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.05 * 0.10 0.05 **
NOHOUSEH -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
CHILDREN 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
RWEALTH 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.03 ** 0.06 0.03 *
FWEALTH 0.13 0.04 *** 0.08 0.02 *** 0.08 0.02 ***






Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
Note 2: Poisson standard errors based on the robust Huber-White covariance matrix 
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Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.12 0.04 *** 0.08 0.03 *** 0.08 0.03 ***
INCOME 0.02 6.7E-03 *** 0.01 4.1E-03 *** 0.01 4.1E-03 ***
INCOMESQ -4.5E-04 2.0E-04 ** -2.9E-04 1.2E-04 ** -2.8E-04 1.3E-04 **
AGE 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05
AGESQ 1.9E-04 1.7E-03 2.2E-04 1.1E-03 -6.8E-04 1.0E-03
SEX 0.08 0.04 ** 0.05 0.02 ** 0.05 0.02 **
LIVCITY 0.07 0.04 * 0.06 0.03 ** 0.04 0.02 *
WEST -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03
EAST -2.7E-05 0.06 9.2E-03 0.04 1.8E-03 0.04
NORTH 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04
EMP 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 9.8E-03 0.04
UNEMP -0.02 0.08 4.0E-03 0.05 -0.01 0.05
HIGH 0.31 0.10 *** 0.20 0.06 *** 0.20 0.06 ***
MEDIUM 0.17 0.08 ** 0.11 0.05 ** 0.13 0.05 **
NOHOUSEH -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04
CHILDREN 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
RWEALTH 0.13 0.06 ** 0.08 0.04 ** 0.07 0.03 **
FWEALTH 0.09 0.04 ** 0.05 0.03 ** 0.05 0.03 **
LWEALTH 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
MBANK_1 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12
MBANK_2 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.12
MBANK_3 0.38 0.21 * 0.23 0.13 * 0.25 0.12 **
MBANK_4 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12
MBANK_5 0.39 0.23 * 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.14 *
MBANK_6 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.13
NOSBANK -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03
BCHOICE 0.11 0.05 ** 0.07 0.03 ** 0.07 0.03 **
BLENGTH 7.1E-03 0.05 0.01 0.03 3.6E-03 0.03
BCLUB 0.09 0.04 ** 0.06 0.02 *** 0.06 0.02 ***






Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
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Although the effect of consumer awareness on multihoming is statistically 
significant, the results seemingly suggest that its economic meaning is smallish. 
According to the Poisson estimates of Panel A, the conditional mean is about 
exp(0.09) ≈  1.09 times larger if ai  =  1 than if ai = 0.  Comparing  consumer 
awareness with the other determinants of multihoming, however, shows that its 
effect is among the strongest. For example, the effect ai is about twice that of SEX 
and that the conditional mean increases by the same proportional amount if 
INCOME increases by one standard deviation, ie, if the respondents’ annual 
income more than doubles. Moreover, our instrumental variable estimations, 




6.3 Robustness  tests 
To assess robustness of the documented effects we run a number of new 
regressions. In these robustness tests we use the two previously defined sets of 
control variables as the basic set of included regressors. For brevity, we only 
discuss the results of the robustness tests informally. 
  Robustness test 1: So far the level of multihoming has been represented by a 
count variable, which raises a concern that our results could be sensitive to the 
definition of the dependent variable. To address the concern, we transform the 
count variable to a binary variable, called DMHOME in Table 1, by recoding 1 to 
0 and values of 2 and more to 1. Although the transformation involves a loss of 
efficiency, it allows us to assess whether using the binary variable as the 
dependent variable changes our basic finding. It does not. Both the Logit and 
Probit estimations show that consumer awareness increases multihoming. 
  Robustness test 2: Another concern is the potential model specificity of our 
results. We derive the demand for multihoming from a rather specific theoretical 
model, which directly yields a count model. Alternatively, one could run reduced-
form regressions, where multihoming is the dependent variable and consumer 
awareness is one explanatory variable among others. Because this approach would 
not necessarily result in a count model, we fit an ordered Logit and Probit models 
to the data. Our results are robust to using these alternative, order-based 
estimators.
13 
                                                 
13 The results are also robust to using the standard negative binomial model. Imposing the nominal 
variance assumption of Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984a,b) and using a two-step 
negative binomial quasi-maximum likelihood estimator would result in a more robust negative 
binomial model. It is, however, equally robust to the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood that we 
use (Wooldridge 1997, 381–382). Because no efficiency gain can be expected, the use of the two-
step negative binomial quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is difficult to motivate here.  
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  Robustness test 3: To address the problem of omitted variables, we construct a 
third set of control variables. The new set allows us to better control for 
heterogeneity that the amount of transactions, Ti, brings into the model. In 
particular, we are concerned about variation in the young Finns’ consumption 
habits beyond what their basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
capture. The new set of regressors are as follows (the descriptive statistics are in 
the Appendix, Table A1): loan market status (BORROWS = 1 if currently has 
outstanding debt), use of the Internet (USEINT = 1 if uses the Internet regularly), 
and planned consumption (SPEND_c  =  1, c  =  1,  2,  …,  6, in which c indexes 
planned near-term spending on education (c  =  1), housing (c  =  2), traveling 
(c = 3), computers (c = 4), sport or outdoor clothing and equipment (c = 5), and 
other (c = 6); the omitted seventh category is for the respondents without near-
term spending plans). 
  Adding the new set of controls does not change our findings: In all 
estimations (OLS, log-OLS, and Poisson) the coefficient of consumer awareness 
remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  Robustness test 4: Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that 
pricing of the payment media matters for the rate of adoption and multihoming 
(Santomero and Seater 1996, Humphrey et al 2001, and Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
While we trust that the regressors reflecting consumers’ banking relationships also 
capture differences in the pricing, a further robustness check is in order. As 
explained in section 2, it is typical that at the age of 26, the use of various banking 
service packages to which cards are often attached cease to be free of charge. 
Crossing this age may thus trigger search and reoptimization. We therefore 
include a dummy equalling one for those who are 26 or over, but the dummy does 
not get a significant coefficient.
14 The coefficient of consumer awareness changes 
only a little, if at all. 
  Robustness test 5: Because our definition of consumer awareness could be 
driving the results, we use an alternative proxy for ai. The alternative indicator 
variable equals 1 if the respondent, in addition to acknowledging that she had 
either received or had been offered a lot of information about debit or credit cards, 
ways of paying bills, use of transaction accounts, or borrowing using credit cards, 
indicated in another series of questions that she needed no further information 
about these products and services. The new proxy effectively captures consumers 
whose demand for information is ‘saturated’. Using the new proxy reduces the 
estimated effect of consumer awareness. Nonetheless, the effect remains positive 
and significant at the 10% level. Moreover, when we use the new proxy in 
instrumental variable estimations, reported in the subsequent section, the 
                                                 
14 It is still possible that in the anticipation of reoptimization, consumers start adjusting their 
demand for payment media before they reach the threshold age. But dummies allowing for this 
type of forward-looking behavior gain no significance.  
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coefficient becomes six times larger and is always significant at the 1% level. The 
increase suggests that measurement error may bias the effect of consumer 
awareness downwards when the alternative proxy is used. 
 
 
7  Is consumer awareness endogenous? 
In this section we relax the assumption of exogenous consumer awareness by 
allowing for the possibility that  ) x ( E ) x , a ( E i i i i i ε ≠ ε . Our empirical model of 
multihoming suggests that ai can be endogenous if it is correlated with the 
unobserved components of the adoption cost ψi, ie, with υi and thus εi. To identify 
sources of such correlation we have to explore the determinants of ai. 
 
 
7.1  Sources of endogeneity 
As we have defined it, consumer awareness reflects consumers’ knowledge about 
the existence and characteristics of payment media. As Guiso and Japelli (2003) 
argue, the awareness reflecting existence can hardly be a choice variable of 
consumers: One can rarely choose to know something that is not known to exist. 
The awareness reflecting characteristics is about the pros and cons of the payment 
media consumers know to be available. Being knowledgeable can be a choice 
variable, but not necessarily. For example, this type of awareness is exogenous for 
a consumer, if it primarily reflects how the issuers of the payment media inform 
her about their products’ characteristics. 
  The foregoing discussion suggests two sources of endogeneity of ai. First, if 
the awareness is not a consumer’s choice variable, endogeneity can originate from 
the marketing strategies of the issuers of the payment media. Some consumers are 
more likely to be targets of informative advertising campaigns than others. 
Endogeneity arises if the propensity of being a target of such a campaign is related 
to  υi. Second, if consumer awareness is a choice variable, endogeneity can 
originate from consumers’ self-selection. Self-selection arises if a consumer 
chooses her level of awareness on the basis of the unobservable adoption cost 
determinants. 
  The above examples illustrate that ai may correlate with υi and, thereby, with 
εi. However, signing the correlation a priori is difficult, as it can go either way. 
For example, we cannot identify the heirs of multihomers. They can be subjected 
to campaigns of the payment media issuers and simultaneously have a lower than 
average cost of adoption. This source of endogeneity would presumably bias the 
estimated effect of consumer awareness upwards. In contrast, a downward bias  
29 
would probably follow, if the heirs simply receive payment media from their 
parents (and thus have lower than average cost of adoption) but are not directly 
offered information about them. 
  As the ability to pay abroad (see section 2) often prompts young Finns to 
acquire a payment card, travelling is another likely source of endogeneity where 
the bias can go either direction. On the one hand, frequent travellers are likely to 
be targets of the campaigns of the payment media issuers and their heavy users. 
An upward bias might therefore follow. On the other hand, many young Finns 
spend long periods abroad, eg, as exchange students or working. Consequently, 
they acquire cards but receive little information from their domestic issuers, 
suggesting a downward bias. 
  Self-selection can induce both negative and positive correlation, too. There 
are, for example, so called early adopters who are enthusiastic about new 
technologies. The early adopters choose to be knowledgeable about the payment 
media and start to use them eagerly. This self-selection gives a rise to an upward 
bias. A downward bias would instead follow, if some consumers actively acquire 
information about the payment media, but have for some (unobserved) reason 
only a limited access to them.
15 
  Moving outside of our model of multihoming other sources of endogeneity 
can also be put forward. For example, endogeneity can arise from measurement 
error in ai or unobserved heterogeneity not related to the costs of adoption.  
 
 
7.2  Empirical model of multihoming with endogenous 
consumer awareness 
We specify a model of multihoming that allows for the endogeneity of ai as 
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where ai* denotes unobserved consumer awareness, zi′ is a row vector of 
observable determinants of the awareness other than those included in xi′, and µ 
and ϕ are column vectors. 
                                                 
15 Note, however, that our model includes two types of regional dummies that, as mentioned, 
control for geographical variation in the intensity of social interactions that is a determinant of 
consumer awareness about financial securities (Guiso and Japelli 2003).  
30 
  A necessary condition for the system specified in (7.1) to be logically 
consistent is that the structural equation of ai* is not a function of ni (Blundell and 
Smith 1994 and Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997). Because the idiosyncratic 
shocks can be correlated, endogeneity can arise even if multihoming does not 
have a direct effect on ai. 
  The system specified in (7.1) allows for ‘an endogenous treatment effect’ 
(Mullahy 1997 and Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997). It can be estimated using 
the method of instrumental variables. Instrumental variables are by definition 




There are two sets of variables that we trust are only related to ni via ai in our data. 
The first set consists of two indicators equalling 1, if the respondent had received 
or had been offered a lot of information about some banking products other than 
those related to paying and payment media. Thus, we code a variable 
INFO_F  =  1, if the information was about housing loans, student loans, term 
deposits, or investing in stocks, mutual funds, etc, and INFO_M  =  1, if the 
information was about using banking services by the Internet or by mobile phone. 
  The identification assumption underlying the instruments is derived from the 
marketing strategies of financial institutions that are often based on the 
advantages associated with the joint production and consumption of financial 
services (see, eg, Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley 1996): If there are such 
advantages, it pays for banks to cross-sell financial products and services and 
pursue ‘one-stop banking’. Cross-selling means that when consumers are 
informed about a banking product, they are also offered information about other 
financial services, such as payment media. Being knowledgeable about banking 
products other than paying and payment media should, however, have no direct 
effect on multihoming. Receiving information, for example, about housing loans 
should have no direct relation to the unobserved costs of adopting payment media. 
Under this assumption, INFO_F and INFO_M are only related to ni through ai. 
  The second set of instrumental variables is build on the following three 
indicators: FIN_FO  =  1, if the consumer responded that she follows regularly 
banking and financial news in media, FIN_IM = 1, if she found it important to be 
literate in banking and financial issues, and FIN_IN = 1, if she were interested to 
know more about banking and banking services. 
  These instruments allow us to control for endogeneity under two assumptions: 
First, a consumer’s overall interest in financial and banking affairs determine her 
awareness about financial products and services, including payment media. 
Second, the overall interest have no direct impact on multihoming beyond that. In  
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particular, if ai takes a good grip of how consumer awareness about payment 
media affects multihoming, the three variables measuring overall interest should 
no longer be direct determinants of multihoming. If these claims are valid, 
{FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN} are only related to multihoming through consumer 
awareness. 
  While we think that there are sound justifications for our instruments, others 
may be more agnostic. We therefore also report below two test statistics to 
illustrate the ‘validity’ of the instruments. The first is an F-test statistic for ‘weak 
instruments’ (Steiger and Stock 1997), which we implement by testing the joint 
significance of the instruments in the first stage. The second is a test for the 
significance of the instruments in the equation for ni with ai included. 
Anticipating, the results indeed indicate that the instruments explain consumer 
awareness about paying and payment media, but not multihoming. 
 
 
7.4  Results of instrumental variable estimations 
For brevity, we only report in Table 3 the results of instrumental variable 
estimations with the short vector of explanatory variables. The set of instruments 
is {INFO_F, INFO_M} in Panel A and {INFO_F, INFO_M, FIN_FO, FIN_IM, 
FIN_IN} in Panel B. We report instrumental variable estimates for the linearized 
model in the first columns of the panels and for the log-transformed model in the 
second columns. In the third columns we present GMM estimates of the Poisson 
model with an endogenous dummy variable.
16 In other words, the results reported 
in Table 3 correspond to the results in Panel A of Table 2, but now the 
endogeneity of ai is allowed for. 
 
                                                 
16 The GMM estimations of the Poisson model were implemented using a Gauss programme 
ExpEnd, written by Frank Windmeijer. The programme contains an estimation code for non-linear 
GMM estimation of exponential models with endogenous regressors (for details, see Windmeijer 
2002). The reported numbers are based on the two-step estimates and multiplicative moment 
conditions (see Mullahy 1997, Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997, Windmeijer 2002). Somewhat 
surprisingly, using additive moment conditions yield almost identical results.  
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Table 3.   Instrumental variables regressions 
 
PANEL A
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.29 0.09 *** 0.18 0.06 *** 0.18 0.05 ***
INCOME 0.02 6.0E-03 *** 0.01 3.8E-03 *** 0.01 3.9E-03 **
INCOMESQ -3.1E-04 1.8E-04 * -2.1E-04 1.2E-04 * -2.0E-04 1.0E-04 *
AGE 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05
AGESQ -9.0E-04 1.6E-03 -5.4E-04 1.0E-04 -1.0E-03 1.0E-03
SEX 0.10 0.04 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.07 0.02 ***
LIVCITY 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 * 0.04 0.02 *
WEST -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03
EAST 0.01 0.06 1.9E-02 0.04 0.02 0.04
NORTH 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
EMP 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
UNEMP -0.05 0.08 -1.7E-02 0.05 -0.02 0.05
HIGH 0.25 0.09 *** 0.17 0.06 *** 0.18 0.06 ***
MEDIUM 0.12 0.07 * 0.08 0.05 * 0.09 0.05 **
NOHOUSEH -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04
CHILDREN 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
RWEALTH 0.10 0.06 * 0.07 0.03 * 0.06 0.03 *
FWEALTH 0.12 0.04 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.08 0.03 ***







Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
Note 2: GMM-Poisson based on two-step estimates and multiplicative moment conditions
0.00           0.00          
942          
19.99           21.28          
Dependent variable: n
2SLS Log-2SLS GMM-Poisson
INFO_F, INFO_M INFO_F, INFO_M
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19 , 922 19 , 922






Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
a 0.30 0.09 *** 0.19 0.05 *** 0.19 0.05 ***
INCOME 0.02 6.2E-03 *** 0.01 3.9E-03 *** 0.01 3.9E-03 **
INCOMESQ -3.1E-04 1.8E-04 * -2.2E-04 1.1E-04 * -2.0E-04 1.0E-04
AGE 7.6E-02 0.07 4.7E-02 0.05 0.07 0.05
AGESQ -9.0E-03 1.6E-03 -5.0E-04 1.0E-03 -1.0E-03 1.0E-03
SEX 0.10 0.04 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.07 0.02 ***
LIVCITY 0.0529 0.04 0.04 0.02 * 0.04 0.02 *
WEST -0.42 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03
EAST 0.01 0.06 1.9E-02 0.04 0.02 0.04
NORTH 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
EMP 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04
UNEMP -0.05 0.08 -1.8E-02 0.05 -0.02 0.05
HIGH 0.25 0.09 *** 0.16 0.06 *** 0.17 0.06 ***
MEDIUM 0.12 0.07 * 0.08 0.05 * 0.09 0.05 **
NOHOUSEH -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04
CHILDREN 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
RWEALTH 0.01 0.06 * 0.07 0.03 * 0.06 0.03 *
FWEALTH 0.12 0.04 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.08 0.02 ***
LWEALTH 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03






Note 1: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;  * significant at the 10% level
Note 2: GMM-Poisson based on two-step estimates and multiplicative moment conditions
0.12          
Dependent variable: n
2SLS Log-2SLS GMM-Poisson
0.00           0.00          
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The results confirm our earlier findings: Consumer awareness is directly linked to 
multihoming. In fact, the estimated effect of ai more than doubles from the 
previous estimations where its endogeneity was not accounted for. It is also 
statistically significant at better than the 1% level. The instrumental variable 
estimates suggest that the informed adopt about 1.2–1.3 times more payment 
media than the less informed. Provocatively put, the estimates suggest that 
consumer awareness is the most important determinant of multihoming. 
  Weak instruments do not bias our instrumental variable estimations. The F-
test statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage has a  
p-value that is invariantly below the 1% threshold. A corresponding joint test for 
the significance of the instruments in the equation for ni with ai included, indicates 
that the instruments do not explain multihoming. The two tests thus support the 
validity of the instruments.  
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  We also consider the robustness of the instrumental variables estimations. 
First we repeat the instrumental variable estimations of Table 3 using the 
alternative proxy for consumer awareness described in section 6.3. The estimated 
effect increases and becomes statistically significant at the 5% level in each of the 
six estimations we run. Second, the results of the instrumental variable 
estimations do not change, when we use the complete set of control variables 
reported in Panel B of Table 2. For example, when the set of instruments is 
{INFO_F, INFO_M}, the coefficient of ai is 0.163 and has a standard error of 
0.064 in the log-transformed model. When the set of instruments is {INFO_F, 
INFO_M, INFO_F, INFO_M, FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN}, the coefficient is 
0.174 and the standard error 0.061. Finally, some may find the identification 
assumption underlying {FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN} more convincing than that 
underlying {INFO_F, INFO_M}. Repeating the instrumental variable estimations 
of Panel B with a trimmed instrument set {FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN} change 




Some consumers use only one medium when paying for their point-of-sale 
transactions, while others use many. Explaining such multihoming behavior is the 
aim of this study. 
  We develop a theoretical model of multihoming and explore its predictions 
empirically using a random sample of young Finnish consumers. We find that in 
our sample more than half multihome and that consumer awareness is a major 
determinant of multi-homing. Our instrumental variable and GMM estimates 
show that the better informed use 1.2–1.3 times more payment media than the less 
informed. They also suggest that the endogeneity of consumer awareness is a real 
concern and can bias the effect of consumer awareness downwards. 
  A starting point of our analysis is that monetary history is full of examples 
where new payment media have taken off only slowly, if at all. As we noted in the 
introduction, even the four major innovations in the way we pay, coins, checks, 
paper money, and the payment card, echo this view, as they were after their 
introduction first used in chorus with the then-established payment media. Our 
findings therefore have a clear-cut implication for the adoption of new payment 
methods, because they suggest that increasing consumer awareness could 
accelerate the adoption of new payment media, such as electronic money and 
mobile payments. Beyond this, the implications of our findings for the payment 
media industry are less clear-cut. Because consumer multihoming intensifies 
platform competition over merchants (Rochet and Tirole 2003), increasing 
consumer awareness is a two-edged sword for the payment media industry. On the  
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one hand, it is advantageous for the merchants, but on the other hand, the issuers 
of payment media encounter a dilemma of prisoner type: Each issuer can have an 
incentive to increase consumer awareness of its own product, but the industry as a 
whole might be better off with less consumer multihoming. 
  Although the positive effect of consumer awareness on multihoming suggests 
that allocating more resources on marketing new payment media might increase 
their adoption rates, a caveat should be borne in mind. We are unfortunately 
unable to identify whether consumer awareness reflects the consumers’ exposure 
to informative advertising or persuasive advertising, or something else (cf. 
Ackerberg 2001). We cannot therefore tell what kind of information provision or 
advertising would boost the demand for payment media. Isolating the mechanisms 
through which consumer awareness influences the adoption of new payment 
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